# SARGOS security contact — RFC 9116 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9116) # # WHERE THIS IS SERVED FROM. apps/web/public/.well-known/security.txt. Next.js serves the # whole of public/ at the site root — including dot-prefixed directories — so this file is # reachable at the canonical URL below. apps/web/next.config.ts additionally pins the # Content-Type for this exact path to text/plain; charset=utf-8, because RFC 9116 §3 # requires it and because Next's custom headers are evaluated BEFORE the filesystem, so the # pin wins over the extension-derived default rather than racing it. # # This file is UTF-8, LF-terminated, and carries no byte-order mark (RFC 9116 §4). # # NO SIGNATURE FIELD, deliberately. RFC 9116 §2.3 allows a detached OpenPGP signature at # security.txt.asc. SARGOS publishes no key yet, and a Signature: pointing at a document # that does not resolve is worse than none: it tells a researcher the file is authenticated # when nothing checks it. The field arrives with the key, not before it. # Where to send a report. A role mailbox, not a personal address, so it survives a change # of operator. Encrypted channels can be arranged on request — see the policy below. Contact: mailto:security@getsargos.com # RFC 9116 §2.5 requires exactly one Expires, in the future, and recommends less than a # year out. Scanners treat an expired security.txt as invalid — i.e. as no security.txt at # all — so this date is an operational deadline, not a formality. Renewal is tracked as a # dated calendar action in docs/pending-manual-actions.md, and # apps/web/src/app/__tests__/security-txt.test.ts fails the build once the date is past. Expires: 2027-06-01T00:00:00.000Z # The human-readable disclosure policy: scope, safe harbour, and the response timeline we # commit to. Source of truth: docs/security/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.md. Policy: https://getsargos.com/security Preferred-Languages: en Canonical: https://getsargos.com/.well-known/security.txt